Modeling agricultural domestic support in China:recent policy reversals and two future scenarios by Yu, Wusheng & Jensen, Hans Grinsted
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Modeling agricultural domestic support in China
Yu, Wusheng; Jensen, Hans Grinsted
Publication date:
2008
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Yu, W., & Jensen, H. G. (2008). Modeling agricultural domestic support in China: recent policy reversals and two
future scenarios. Fødevareøkonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet. IFRO Working Paper, No. 4, Vol.. 2008
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
  
 
Modeling Agricultural Domestic Support in 
China:  
recent policy reversals and two future scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics (FOI) 
Working Paper 2008/4 
Modeling Agricultural Domestic Support in China: recent 
policy reversals and two future scenarios 
Wusheng Yu and Hans G. Jensen 
Email: wusheng@foi.dk 
Revised April 2008 
Abstract 
This paper reviews recent development of China’s agricultural domestic support pol-
icy, especially the switch from taxing farmers and agriculture to providing direct sub-
sidies to grain production and purchased inputs. A model-based quantitative analysis 
on the effects of these policy changes has been conducted. Simulation results suggest 
that recent policy changes likely have positively addressed the declared policy objec-
tives in increasing grain production and boosting farm income. Much of the increase 
in grain production and farm income can be attributed to land reallocation to grain 
production, cheaper inputs, and extra agricultural employment triggered by the pol-
icy changes.  
Judging from the rural-urban and west-east income gaps in China, the diminishing 
share of agriculture in China’s economy, and the current political environment, it is 
expected that the tax cut will be permanent and that government assistance to agri-
culture and farmers will continue and rise. Two hypothetical future scenarios are 
simulated. If China uses up all its WTO de minimis support allowances and an as-
sumed Blue Box cap in a manner consistent with its current practices, increased grain 
production, changing trade pattern seemingly contrary to China’s comparative ad-
vantage, increased rural employment, and significantly higher farm income (over 
16%) will be expected. If alternative, decoupled payments are provided, China’s ag-
ricultural production and trade will remain unchanged, rural employment stays sta-
ble. But as a way of transferring income, the decoupled payments will be more effi-
cient.  
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1. Introduction 
China’s agriculture policy has undergone some fundamental changes in recent years, 
as ambitious reductions of agricultural taxes and fees have been carried out and direct 
subsidies to farmers and agricultural productions have been introduced. Total agricul-
tural taxation, including agricultural tax, special agriculture products tax, agricultural 
tax surcharges, was reduced from CNY 51.7 billion in 2003 to CNY 1.62 billion in 
2005.1 At the same time, the Chinese government has started to provide various sub-
sidies, including direct payments to grain producers based on planting areas, direct 
subsidies to purchased farm inputs, subsidies to seeds, and subsidies to agricultural 
machineries. These subsidies amounted to CNY 31 billion and 42.7 billion in 2006 
and 2007, respectively.2 In addition, other forms of assistance to agriculture have also 
been increased in recent years. In fact, total assistance to farmers and agriculture, in-
cluding the above mentioned subsidies, has been on the rise even prior to the reform 
of agriculture taxes. For example, the Producer Support Estimates (PSE) compiled by 
the OECD (2006) reports only a 4 percent share of total agriculture support in total 
gross farm receipt in 2000. This share rose to 10 percent in 2003 and remained at 8 
percent in 2005 (based on a much larger total value of agriculture production as com-
pared to that in 2003).3   
 
This policy reversal – moving from the tradition of taxing farmers and agriculture to 
providing subsidies – clearly reflects the Chinese leadership’s attention to the so-
called “San-Nong” problem (i.e. the three agriculture-related issues: agriculture, rural 
areas, and peasants). The core of the “San-Nong” problem is the relative decline of 
farm income (as compared to income earned by urban residents) and in connection to 
this, the rising rural-urban income gap and the East-West regional imbalance in 
China. Although migrations of rural labors to urban areas and off-farm activities in 
the rural areas have helped moderate the widening income gaps, rural residents solely 
                                                 
1 These numbers are collected from the official website of Ministry of Agriculture, China 
(www.agri.gov.cn).  
2 These figures are mainly gathered from official documents of the Ministry of Finance, China 
(www.mof.gov.cn) and are presented in Table 2. 
3 The PSE tables for China include more support instruments than agriculture tax and subsidies 
mentioned in the text, such as market price support, payments based on area planted/animal num-
bers, on input use, on input constraints, and on overall farming income. In 2005, the total PSE for 
China was estimated to be over CNY291 billion, including over CNY100 billion on market price 
support, 13.2 billion payments based on areas planted, 89.8 billion payments on input use, 55 billion 
on input constraints, and nearly 30 billion payments based on overall farm income. 
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relying on farm income have nevertheless experienced much slower income growth in 
recent years. In responding to these challenges, the current Chinese leadership has 
placed the “San-Nong” problem among its top priorities. For instance, the various 
“No. 1 documents” of recent years emphasize the need to increase farm income and 
the importance of maintaining grain self-sufficiency as a way of improving farm in-
come.4 Reducing/eliminating agriculture tax and introducing direct subsidies are con-
sidered essential instruments in achieving these policy objectives. Needless to say, 
strong economic growth has sped up this policy reversal as agriculture’s share in 
China’s GDP is shrinking and the once-vital revenue from agricultural taxations is 
becoming less and less important to the national treasury.5  
 
In light of these policy trends, many interesting research questions emerge. Some of 
these questions are concerned with the embodied domestic policy objectives. For in-
stance, to what extent have these changes led to the realization of the policy objec-
tives of raising farm income and maintaining grain self-sufficiency? Is the emphasis 
on grain production consistent with the objective of raising farm income? Are there 
better ways to achieve these objectives?  
 
Looking ahead, it appears that an about-face of recent policy reversal is unlikely. On 
the contrary, there are indications that the abolishment of agriculture tax will be per-
manent and the subsidies will increase in the coming years. Assuming this trend con-
tinues, one would also ask whether current subsidy instruments will still be applied in 
the future, especially in connection to the relevant disciplines on agricultural domestic 
support contained in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). In the case of 
China, the relevant disciplines are the de minimis exemption on the Aggregate Meas-
ure of Support (AMS) and the so-called “Blue Box” payments (e.g. those production-
limiting programs that are based on fixed area and yields). Should the support paid in 
the current forms approach or even exceed the applicable exemption ceilings, China 
                                                 
4 These documents were issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the 
State Council of China. There have been ten such documents, all of which addressed issues related 
to agriculture, rural areas, and peasants. The first five “No. 1 documents” were issued during 1982-
1986, whereas the last five were issued during 2004-2008. A brief overview of these documents (in 
Chinese) can be found at the official Xinhua News Agency’s website 
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2006-02/09/content_4156863.htm), which also contains links to 
full text to the latest documents. The full text of the 2007 No. 1 Document was publicly released by 
the Xinhua News Agency on January 29, 2007 (see http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-
01/29/content_5670478.htm) 
5 In 1950, agricultural tax revenue comprised of 39 percent of China’s total tax revenue. This share 
shrank to 5.5 percent in 1979 and to less than 1 percent in 2004 (Ministry of Finance, China).   
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might have to re-design its support programs to make them comply with its WTO 
commitments. One way of doing so without cutting the spending is to switch from the 
presumably inefficient and trade/production-distorting support instruments to less dis-
torting decoupled instruments which can be classified as Green Box payments.6 
 
The purposes of this paper are to provide a first quantitative assessment on the impact 
of recent policy changes on China’s agricultural production, trade and farm income, 
and to evaluate likely consequences of their possible future developments with a ref-
erence to China’s WTO commitments on agricultural domestic support.7 Findings 
from these exercises will not only contribute to the understanding of these policy 
trends and their consequences, but also provide useful insights into designing agricul-
tural domestic support in the future for China. 
 
The quantitative exercises underlying the analysis contained in the current paper are 
conducted within a computable general equilibrium framework where detailed policy 
instruments relating to agricultural taxation and the new subsidies are represented. 
This modeling framework also allows for alternative policy instruments to be ana-
lyzed in counterfactual scenarios. Budget outlays associated with the policy instru-
ments, collected from official Chinese sources and the OECD’s PSE estimates for 
China, are calibrated to a global database accompanying the model. Together the da-
tabase and the model are deployed for conducting the quantitative analysis.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews recent agricultural 
policy development and most recent policy practices in China. How these policy de-
velopments fit into China’s domestic policy objectives and how they comply with 
China’s WTO commitment are also discussed in this section. In section 3, we docu-
ment our efforts on modeling recent changes in China’s agricultural policy and on 
constructing various future scenarios. Section 4 reports the results from simulating the 
various policy scenarios. The last section concludes the paper. 
                                                 
ins.  
6 At the time of writing this paper, the only notification made to the WTO by China concerning ag-
ricultural domestic support was submitted in 2006 for the reporting period 1999-2001 (WTO, 2006). 
The notified current total AMS and Blue Box were both zeros for 2001. However, China did report 
CNY242 billion Green Box payments for 2001.  
7 To our best knowledge, there are virtually no published quantitative analyses on the effects of re-
cent policy changes on China’s farm income and agricultural production. The exception is Gale et 
al. (2005), which provides a “back of the envelope” calculation suggesting a CNY18 per mu 
(equivalent to 667 square meters or 1/15 hectare) contribution of tax reduction and subsidies to 
“profit” from three major gra
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2. Recent Development of Agricultural Domestic Support 
Policy in China 
In this section we briefly review most recent agricultural policy development in China 
(from 2003 to 2007). This discussion is mainly based on data collected from official 
Chinese sources such as the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture and is 
focused exclusively on the elimination of agricultural tax and the introduction of di-
rect subsidies. For a more comprehensive discussion of China’s domestic support pol-
icy development for the earlier period of 1995-2005 using the PSE and related esti-
mates of the OECD, readers are referred to Kwieciński and van Tongeren (2007).8  
2.1. Elimination of agriculture taxes 
Agriculture tax had been levied since the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China and an agricultural tax law was put into force formally in 1958. This tax was 
typically levied as a percentage of the production value of a given land area, based on 
historical prices and yields. The average tax rate (including agricultural tax sur-
charges) as a share of actual agricultural production value fluctuated between 2 and 
15 percent from year to year (Ministry of Finance, China). Since 1983, the State 
Council of China (i.e. China’s central government) decided to collect special agricul-
tural products tax in addition to the normal agricultural tax. In 1994, a herding tax 
was added. In 1950, revenues from agriculture tax were almost 40% of total tax reve-
nue of China, a share that has declining gradually, reaching about 5.5% in 1979 and 
less than 1% in 2004. 
 
In 2004, the central government of China decided to drastically reduce agricultural 
taxes and other levies and fees. In that year, special agricultural products tax (other 
than tax on tobacco) was eliminated (from a level of CNY 2.8 in 2003) and agricul-
ture tax was nearly halved from its 2003 level of CNY 39.2 billion (Table 1). Agricul-
tural tax surcharges were also brought down from CNY9.66 billion in 2003 to CNY 
4.89 billion in 2004. In 2005, agricultural tax was further reduced to CNY1.27 billion, 
and agricultural tax surcharges was brought down to CNY 0.35 billion. In December 
2005, The National People’s Congress (NPC) of China decided to abolish the agricul-
tural tax law. By 2006, the remaining agriculture tax was totally eliminated nation-
wide. 
                                                 
8 Orden et al. (2007) also discussed the PSE estimates for China, using data for the period 1995-
2001. Gale et al. (2005) described China’s agricultural policy changes up to 2005. 
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2.2.  Introduction of direct subsidies 
Accompanying the reduction and elimination of agriculture taxes and fees, the Chi-
nese government has started to introduce various direct subsidies – including direct 
payments to grain producers based on acreages, direct subsidies to purchased farm 
inputs including fuels and fertilizers, direct subsidies to improved varieties of seeds, 
and direct subsidies to the purchase of agricultural machineries – to farmers and agri-
cultural production (see Table 2).  
 
In 2004, CNY11.6 billion from the State Grain Risk Fund was used to directly subsi-
dize grain producers. The distribution of these subsidies roughly follows a two-tier 
method. First, the central government transfers funds to the provinces based on each 
province’s historical grain outputs as well as the amount of outputs supplied to the 
market. As such, much of this fund was paid to producers in the main grain producing 
provinces. This principle reflects the central government’s desire in maintaining a cer-
tain level of grain output. At the provincial level, the subsidy is further distributed to 
farmers mainly based on their planting areas because of the administrative burden of 
figuring out each and every farmer’s actual output. This subsidy was further increased 
to 13.2 billion in 2005 and 14.2 billion in 2006. Latest report indicates that the sub-
sidy would be expected to reach 15.1 billion for 2007 (see Table 2).  
 
Another major instrument of direct subsidies to farmers is linked to purchased farm 
inputs such as fuels and fertilizers. This subsidy, officially named “comprehensive 
direct subsidy to agriculture production materials” by the Chinese government, was 
first given in 2006 with a national expenditure of CNY12 billion.9 It has been re-
ported that it would rise to 27.6 billion in 2007 (Ministry of Finance, 2007), mainly 
for the purposes of offsetting the high fuel costs to grain producers. The disbursement 
principle of this subsidy is again according to the area planted (taking into considera-
tion the fact that in some areas it is possible to harvest twice or more in a year).  
 
These two types of subsidies totaled CNY 26.2 billion in 2006 and were expected to 
reach CNY42.7 billion for 2007, which implies a per mu subsidy of CNY 27 nation-
wide (CNY30 for main grain production provinces and CNY 20 for other prov-
inces).10 
                                                 
9 Previously, prices of these inputs were artificially held low and the producers of these inputs re-
ceived subsidies from the government, 
10 Mu is the traditional measurement of land areas in China. One mu equals 666.67 square meters. 
 
8    FOI  Modeling Agricultural Domestic Support in China: 
In addition to the above subsidies, grain producers also receive additional payments 
based on the adoption of quality seeds and purchases of agricultural machineries. 
Seed subsidies reached CNY4.15 billion in 2006 whereas subsidies to machineries 
were about CNY 600 million in the same year.  
2.3. Total assistance to farmers and agricultural production 
To summarize, as compared to 2003, in 2006 Chinese farmers at least received extra 
transfer payment of more than CNY 80 billion, including the abolished tax burden 
(around CNY 52 billion in 2003) and various direct subsidies (CNY 31 billion in 
2006). According to the statistics released by the Ministry of Finance of China, na-
tionwide total spending on supporting agriculture increased from CNY 214.4 billion 
in 2003 to 339.7 billion in 2006, of which CNY 103 billion (78.2 billion was paid for 
by the central government) was the transfer payments related to the agricultural tax 
reform.11  
2.4. Long term trends and China’s WTO commitments on domestic support  
The upward trend in providing direct subsidies is in addition to the elimination of 
taxes and is in spite of high prices of grains in recent years. Indeed, not only direct 
subsidies are on the rise, but also total producer support to agriculture as measured in 
the PSE has been increasing in recent years. Will this trend continue? Considering the 
political decisions on solving the so-called “San-Nong” problem and the campaign of 
“building a socialist new countryside” made by the current Chinese leadership, one 
has the reason to believe that the elimination of agricultural taxes will be permanent. 
It is also probable that total public assistance to agriculture, including direct subsidies, 
will continue to rise. Assuming this trend continues, a relevant hypothetical scenario 
for illustration/discussion purposes is one in which China actually uses up all its 
WTO allowances in a future date.  
 
                                                 
11 Although the exact method for calculating the nationwide total spending on supporting agriculture 
is not made clear in the official documents of the Ministry of Finance, these numbers seem to match 
the amount listed for the item “total transfer from taxpayers” in the Total Support Estimates (TSE) 
of the OECD. The total transfer from taxpayers is defined as the sum of the PSE (including market 
price support which is generally caused by protection measures applied at the border), the General 
Services Support Estimates (GSSE), and the transfer from producers to consumers (which is often 
negative as the main component of this item is the market price support paid by consumers to pro-
ducers). This measure is estimated to be CNY206 billion in 2003 and 302 billion in 2005 by the 
OECD. 
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In the Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO, the de minimis exemption available to 
a developing country member is generally set at 10 percent of the member’s agricul-
tural production value. In the case of China, this exemption is 8.5 percent as specified 
in its WTO accession agreement. In addition, China is also allowed to use Blue Box 
payments. There have been discussions on capping the Blue Box in the Doha Round 
negotiations and a 5 percent (of total agriculture production value) cap is assumed in 
this paper to facilitate our following discussion. In addition, as a WTO member, 
China is also allowed to apply the so-called Green Box payments which are non-
distorting or ”minimally” distorting. The two limits on the de minimis payments and 
the Blue Box payments set the maximum amount of trade and production distortion-
ing domestic support that China can provide for supporting its agriculture sector. A 
hypothetical scenario therefore assumes that China provide the two types of support 
up to their respective limits. Simulating this scenario provides the opportunity to 
quantitatively investigate how these allowances will be used and what kind of effects 
can be expected.  
3. Modeling agricultural domestic support in China 
3.1. The basic model and dataset  
We adopt a computable general equilibrium model with agricultural sectoral details 
for modeling and analyzing recent changes in agricultural domestic support policy in 
China. This model is a modified version of the well-known global GTAP model 
(Hertel, 1997). The simulation exercises are based on a recent pre-release of the ac-
companying GTAP database (version 7).12 The most recent GTAP version 7 data base 
(pre-release) covers 101 countries/groups of countries and 57 sectors. For the pur-
poses of this paper, we aggregate the original database to a manageable size of 12 re-
gions (including China and its main trading partners, as well as several aggregated 
regions covering the rest of the world) and 43 sectors (including all the agriculture 
and food sectors originally listed in the disaggregated GTAP database).  
 
Important modifications to the standard GTAP model and the accompanying GTAP 
version 7 data base include:  
 
                                                 
12 Documentation of the GTAP-7 database has not yet been made available. Detailed documentation 
of the GTAP-6 database, however, can be found in Dimaranan (2006)  
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• Modeling and calibrating China’s agricultural domestic support policy into 
the GTAP model and the version 7 data base. This is described in the next 
section. 
• Dividing total area of land in China into three separated types: arable land, 
land used for permanent crops, and pasture land. This separation is motivated 
by the fact that the Chinese government generally discourages farmers from 
switching land used in grain production to other uses. Moreover, China’s ter-
ritory covers several different climatic zones, each of which is suitable for 
growing a certain range of products. By dividing the total land area into three 
broadly defined land types, we avoid the obvious problem of allocating a cer-
tain type of land into producing certain products which it normally cannot 
produce economically (e.g. turning permanent pasture land into rice paddies). 
Data for making this split has been obtained from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the UN (FAO). Within each land type, in observing changing 
returns to land, land is allowed to move imperfectly among different products 
according to a constant elasticity of transformation function characterized by 
finite elasticities of transformation. 
• Allowing for rural unemployment of unskilled workers. In the standard 
GTAP model, full employment is assumed and wages of unskilled worker are 
equalized across urban and rural sectors. However, it has long been suggested 
that there have been hidden unemployment and/or under-employment in 
China’s rural areas. Since the State Statistics Bureau of China only releases 
data on urban unemployment, there have been only unofficial estimates on 
the extent of rural unemployment in China (see for example Wolf et al., 
2003). Recently, Cai (2007) suggests that “residual” or unem-
ployed/underemployed rural labor was about 105 million in the year 2005, or 
about 22% of total rural labor in China for that year. By piecing together in-
formation from difference sources, Cai further estimates that the “residual” 
rural labor under the age of 40 was about 52 million in 2005, which was 
about 10.7% of China’s total rural labor. Based on these estimates, we con-
jecture a simple functional relationship between rural employment of un-
skilled labor and return to rural labor that specifies how increased return to 
rural labor stimulates additional rural employment. The additional rural em-
ployment shifts out the production possibility frontier for agricultural prod-
ucts and limits the extent of wage hikes for rural labor. As will be seen later 
in this paper, the employment effect of agricultural subsidies is crucial in de-
termining the welfare effects of recent changes in agricultural policy in 
China.  
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3.2. Modeling and calibrating China’s agricultural domestic support  
We first make a correspondence between China’s agricultural policy instruments – 
which are summarized and quantified in the OECD’s Producer Support Estimates 
(OECD, 2006) – and the relevant policy variables in the GTAP model. Policy instru-
ments in the GTAP model that are relevant for analyzing China’s recent agricultural 
policy changes are output tax/subsidy, intermediate input subsidy, and land and capi-
tal based subsidy, all of which are defined as ad valorem tax wedges. Where possible, 
we also place individual instruments into different WTO Boxes according to our un-
derstanding of the instruments in relation to the various “boxes” and how they are re-
ported in China’s notifications to the WTO. 13 These designations will facilitate our 
later discussion on the future development of China’s agricultural domestic support.   
 
To make the discussion more concrete, we refer to the PSE estimates for China in 
2003 (presented in the first two columns in Table 3), a year before China imple-
mented its ambitious agriculture tax reform and hence a good starting point for carry-
ing out our numerical analysis. Furthermore, as these estimates have not been incor-
porated into the latest GTAP database (version 7 pre-release), we describe how the 
actual PSE estimates for 2003 are classified and how they are incorporated into the 
latest GTAP 7 database, which are subsequently used as the starting point for our 
evaluation of recent policy changes.  
   
Agricultural output tax or subsidy in the GTAP model captures the difference be-
tween the producer price and the market price of an agricultural product. A positive 
difference implies a subsidy whereas a negative difference signals a tax. This instru-
ment is used to model China’s agricultural tax on all primary agriculture products in 
the year 2003 (i.e. prior to the abolishment of agricultural tax).  Due to the lack of 
data on the distribution of agricultural taxes across different products, a simplified as-
sumption has been adopted in our calibration of the database to ensure that the nearly 
CNY49 billion agricultural tax and agricultural tax surcharges in 2003 are equal-
proportionately distributed across all primary agricultural products. The special agri-
                                                 
13 The PSE and the various WTO Boxes serve very different purposes. Simply put, the PSE is used 
to measure border and domestic support policy instruments. The PSE, however, is not the measure 
used in the WTO negotiations. The WTO Boxes are more of a legal concept useful in negotiating 
reductions in domestic support policies and do not necessarily reflect the true levels of support to 
agriculture. For a discussion on the relationship between the PSE and WTO Boxes (or the Aggre-
gated Measure of Support), see Josling et al. (1996) and Orden (2007).    
 
12    FOI  Modeling Agricultural Domestic Support in China: 
cultural products tax of CNY 2.8 billion is distributed to the vegetable and fruits, and 
the other crops sectors.     
   
Intermediate input tax/subsidy in the GTAP model is similarly defined to capture the 
difference between farmers’ purchasing price and the corresponding market price of a 
specific intermediate input used in a specific primary agricultural product. Farmers 
receive a subsidy (pay a tax) when the difference is negative (positive). The main in-
termediate input subsidies used by China are the ones on fertilizer, pesticide, seed, 
other purchased farm inputs (which are considered as “Amber Box” payments), as 
well as advisory service and pest/disease controls (which are considered “Green Box” 
payments). For the year 2003, the PSE table shows that these subsidies amounted to 
CNY 17.9 billion, a number that needs to be calibrated into the GTAP database to 
form the basis of quantitative analysis. To do so, these subsidies are allocated equal-
proportionately to all inputs that are used by all primary agriculture products in China. 
That is, for intermediate input i used in producing product j, the share of the cali-
brated subsidy – denoted as TFD(i,j) – in total intermediate input subsidies in agricul-
ture should be equal to the corresponding value share of input i used in product j in 
total value of all intermediate inputs in agriculture. This ensures a uniform intermedi-
ate subsidy rate for all the intermediate inputs used across all the primary agriculture 
products.          
 
Land (or capital)-based agricultural subsidy in the GTAP model measures the differ-
ence between farmers’ rental price over the market rental price of land (or capital). A 
positive difference implies that farmers pay a tax, whereas a negative difference im-
plies a subsidy in favor of farmers. Before the abolishment of agriculture tax, China 
used funds on the so-called “Grain for Green” program and made payments to allevi-
ate the effects of natural disasters. These payments are considered as decoupled or 
“Green Box” subsidies given to arable land in our modeling. More specifically, the 
reported spending of CNY 66.9 billion for 2003 is assumed to be distributed to arable 
land used in individual crops according to the production value shares of these crops. 
In our hypothetical scenarios on future development of China’s domestic support, ad-
ditional land-based payments can either be decoupled payments or are assumed to be 
given to land used in grain production only. The final item listed in Table 3 is “on 
farm investment on infrastructure” which are modeled as a subsidy to capital used in 
all primary agriculture products.   
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It should be noted that the standard GTAP model treats the above policy instruments 
as ad valorem tax wedges. To make sure that the budget outlays under the various in-
struments reported in Table 3 are correctly represented in the modified GTAP data-
base, in the actual calibration process we choose to target the budget outlays while 
allowing the tax wedges to adjust.14 
3.3. Policy scenarios and their calibration 
Based on the modified GTAP 7 database, the following policy scenarios are con-
structed and simulated: 
 
a. Scenario A: the abolishment of agricultural taxes, the introduction of direct 
subsidies to grain producers, direct subsidies to purchased inputs by grain 
producers, and increased subsidies to grain seeds. This scenario is conducted 
to gauge the effects of the so-called “reducing peasants’ burden” policy ini-
tiatives. Spending on these subsidies is assumed to reach the level of 2005 
(reported in Column 3 in Table 3) and the shocks to the corresponding ad 
valorem instruments in the model are conducted in a way to lock in these tar-
geted spending levels, as follows:  
 
First, output taxes for all agriculture products are reduced to zero in the experiment. 
Second, the newly introduced direct subsidy to grains is modeled as land-based pay-
ment for land used in grain production. This subsidy is increased from zero in the 
starting base data to CNY13.2 billion in 2005. The exact amount distributed to land 
used in a certain crop is proportional to the historical planting areas for that crop. 
Since returns to land vary across different crop sectors in China, such an allocation of 
the subsidies results in different ad valorem subsidy rates for different crops. Third, 
input-based subsides (fertilizer, pesticide, and seeds, etc.) are increased from the 2003 
base level of CNY 6.1 billion to the 2005 baseline level of CNY 56.8 billion.15 This is 
                                                 
14 This is done by “swapping” the exogenous tax wedge with the normally endogenous budget out-
lays so that the latter becomes exogenous and can then be shocked into the level reported in Table 3. 
Changing the budget outlays is carried out via a GTAP program called “altertax” (Malcolm, 1998).  
15 According to the latest number from the PSE table, CNY 45 billion was used as subsidies to input 
uses, including payment made to state-owned agricultural input manufacturers to cover their losses 
resulting from selling pesticide, fertilizer and mulching film to farmers at the state administered 
price. It appears from latest official Chinese documents that direct subsidies for purchasing these 
inputs (also including fuel) have been offered farmers, having reached CNY 12 billion in 2006. It is 
not clear whether the subsidies paid to input producers have been reduced accordingly. In this paper, 
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done by imposing a homogenous increase in the subsidy rates across all primary agri-
culture products.  
 
Simulating Scenario A leads to these policy instruments reaching the targets dis-
cussed   above. These targets are reflected in the updated GTAP database follow-
ing the simulations. This updated database then become the baseline for conduct-
ing the two subsequent hypothetical scenarios on further development of China’s 
agricultural domestic support. 
 
a. Scenario B1: a hypothetical situation where China decides to increase its 
spending on subsidizing agricultural and farmers. This scenario is con-
structed in the context of the agriculture agreement of the WTO and China’s 
WTO accession commitment. It is assumed in the scenario that China will 
exhaust its domestic support “allowances” permitted by the WTO. These al-
lowances include Blue Box payments valued at 5 percent of the value of 
China’s agriculture production, and an 8.5 percent (based on the value of its 
“normal” agricultural production) de minimis payment on a non-product spe-
cific basis. Since China’s domestic support spending in the baseline (i.e. sce-
nario A) is well below the permitted levels, simulating this scenario implies 
an increase of both types of payments from the baseline. The detailed as-
sumption applied in this scenario is as follows. 
 
Among the instruments used in the baseline (i.e. scenario A), direct subsidies given to 
grain producers are given according to historical planting areas and as such modeled 
as Blue Box payments. The assumed 5 percent Blue Box cap in this scenario implies 
that these subsidies need to be increased from the baseline level of CNY 13.2 billion 
to 121 billion, which is roughly 5 percent of the agricultural production value around 
the year 2004, according to the PSE table for China. Note that by increasing direct 
subsidies to land used in grain production, additional arable land will move into grain 
production and away from non-grain production. This in turn will increase the output 
of grains. However, because of the inflow of additional arable land, the percentage 
increase in the per mu subsidies will fall short of the percentage increase in total di-
rect subsidies. 
 
                                                                                                                          
we assume that the subsidies offered to farmers were in addition to the subsidies given to the input 
producers. This results in a higher amount of total intermediate subsidies at around CNY 56.8 bil-
lion. 
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There are numerous scenarios in which the de minimis allowance can be used, be-
cause many instruments can be considered trade and production distorting. For illus-
tration and discussion purposes, in this paper we assume that all the current non-blue 
box payments in the baseline are considered and remain part of the de minimis ex-
emption. We then allocate the remaining de minimis allowance within the 8.5 percent 
limit – valued around CNY 149 billion – as output subsidies applied to all primary 
agricultural products.16, 17 
 
To summarize, this scenario introduces a new agriculture output subsidy of CNY 149 
billion, maintains the same input-based subsidies of CNY 56.7 billion, and increases 
the direct subsidies to grain production (tied to land used in grain production) from 
CNY 13.2 billion to 121 billion. Taken together, this implies a total non-green box 
support of CNY 326.8 billion, representing an increase of non-Green Box support by 
roughly CNY 267 billion over the baseline level.         
 
a. Scenario B2: a hypothetical scenario where China decides to spend the addi-
tional Blue Box and de minimis allowances – valued at around CNY 267 bil-
lion (which are over and above the current payments in baseline scenario A; 
see Table 3) in a “decoupled” manner. Similar to the recent reform of the 
Common Agriculture Policy of the European Union, we assume that these 
decoupled payments are given as a uniform payment to all arable land, re-
gardless of the production choices made by land-owners among different 
crop products. These payments will augment farmers’ income without dis-
torting their production decisions. Therefore, these decoupled payments may 
be considered Green Box instruments which are not currently disciplined and 
capped by the WTO. Our modeling and implementation of these payments in 
the model follow Frandsen et al. (2003) and Jensen and Yu (2006). 
                                                 
16 We adopt the following simplifying assumption in distribution this amount across products: each 
product receives an equal ad valorem output subsidy. Note that this instrument is exactly the oppo-
site of the agricultural tax previously levied on agriculture outputs.    
17 By only considering non-product specific de minimis payment, we avoid the more technical inter-
pretations on how much support a country can actually spend within its de minimis limit. Moreover, 
this also simplifies the way the shocks in the scenario are generated (see footnote 17). For a more 
rigorous discussion on the classification and measurement of domestic support instruments in WTO 
negotiation, see Brink (2007).      
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4. Results 
In this section simulation results are reported, mainly on changes of China’s agricul-
ture outputs, exports and imports (presented in Table 5), as well as the implied effects 
on economic welfare and farm income (reported in Table 4). Numbers reported for 
Scenario A are changes/percentage changes from the 2003 base, whereas results re-
ported for Scenarios B1 and B2 are changes/percentages from the same 2005 baseline 
defined as the post-simulation database following the shocks contained in Scenario A. 
4.1. Effects of abolishing agricultural tax and providing direct subsidies (Sce. 
A) 
Abolishing agricultural tax on primary agriculture products – which are assumed to be 
uniform across these products – generally boost outputs of these products. However, 
the introduction of direct subsidies (modeled as a land-based subsidy) and the in-
creased input- based subsidies to grain production further reduces the cost of produc-
ing grains and hence expands their outputs. From Table 5, it can be seen that outputs 
of rice, wheat and other grains increase by 0.9, 6.3 and 2.1 percent, respectively. With 
the assumption of no productivity progresses in the agriculture sectors, these increases 
have been partially made possible by drawing land from the non-grain agricultural 
sectors.18 Furthermore, part of the unemployed or underemployed rural labors is at-
tracted into agricultural production (a 1.2 percent increase in rural unskilled labor), 
especially in the production of grains.  
 
Increased domestic production of grains and other agriculture products implies im-
proved trade balances of these products due to increased exports (e.g. 19.9 percent for 
other grains and 48.4 percent for wheat) and reduced imports (8.3 percent for other 
grains and 17.2 percent for wheat), as can be seen from Table 5. 
 The above results seem to suggest that the simulated policy changes do serve the 
purposes of increasing grain production and improving the self-sufficiency of grains, 
as compared to the baseline that mimics the pre-reform situation (i.e. the 2005 base). 
Do these changes help improve farm income (which is the other important objective 
of these policy changes)? According to our simulation results, total factor income in 
primary agriculture rises by 8 percent following these policy changes (Table 4). This 
overall increase in farm income can be understood by the large increases in returns to 
production factors used in agriculture, in particular land and rural unskilled labor. Due 
                                                 
18 The re-allocation of land amongst agriculture products actually leads to a contraction of the “other 
crops” sector, despite the abolishment of the output tax.   
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to the finite elasticity of transformation governing the allocation of different types of 
land across products, average rental prices of different types of land are shown to be 
different. Rental price of arable land increases the most (over 16 percent on average), 
followed by that of pasture land and permanent crops (11.5 percent and 7.1 percent, 
respectively). As for returns to rural unskilled labor, the increase of 3.8 percent is not 
as dramatic, reflecting the model assumption of unemployment/under-employment in 
the rural areas. In addition to the above, rural employment is also shown to increase at 
1.2 percent, thereby augmenting the increase in overall farm income.     
 
The economic welfare consequence of these policy changes also appears to be posi-
tive. The calculated welfare gains (measured in equivalent variations) of US$2,255 
million are due to the increased employment in agriculture, which shifts out the pro-
duction possibility frontier of the economy, and a comparable gain in the terms-of-
trade. In contrast, the joint allocation efficiency effects of abolishing agriculture tax 
and introducing direct subsidies are slightly negative, due to the large overall in-
creases in government assistances.   
4.2. Effects of exhausting WTO domestic support “allowances” (Scenario B1) 
In this scenario, with the output subsidies (within the 8.5 percent de minimis limit) 
equally distributed to all primary agriculture products, all outputs are boosted signifi-
cantly (see Table 5). The extra acreage-based subsidies to grain farmers (the assumed 
Blue Box payments), however, alter the expansion patterns across products. Outputs 
of rice, wheat and other grains increase by respectively 1.6, 12 and 1.8 percent over 
the 2005 baseline level. For a few other agricultural sectors – most notably oil seeds 
and other crops – outputs actually decline. Again, these output changes can be attrib-
uted to the inter-sectoral land reallocation and the increased rural employment. For 
instance, uses of arable land in wheat and other grains increase substantially (by 12 
and 5.8 percent, respectively), thereby reducing land available to non-grain products.  
Increased grain production leads to improved net trade positions for China in these 
products, with more dramatic increases in their exports and decreases in their imports 
(than what have been reported from Scenario A). However, the trade balance pattern 
reverses for those products of which outputs decrease (e.g. oil seeds, other crops, 
vegetables and fruits, etc). These production and trade pattern changes suggest that 
the additional subsidies aiming at increasing grain production may have the side-
effect of creating mismatches between China’s trade pattern and the commonly be-
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lieved comparative advantages of China in producing labor-intensive agricultural 
products.19   
 
With both the de minimis and the assumed blue box allowances being fully used, 
simulation results show that total agriculture factor income increases by 16.2%. This 
result can be partially explained by significantly higher land rental prices, especially 
for the land used in grain sector (increased by over 40 percent). Rental price of land in 
the non-grain sectors also increase due to the assumed increase in output subsidies, 
but to a less extent (12 percent for land used for growing permanent crops and 15.7 
for pasture land). In addition, increases in both the wage rate for rural skilled labors 
(4.7 percent) and in rural employment (1.5 percent) also play important roles in aug-
menting overall farm income.  
  
Speaking of economic welfare, the additional subsidies assumed in this scenario lead 
to larger negative allocation efficiency effects to the Chinese economy, estimated to 
be US$1.65 billion.20  However, increased rural employment (of unskilled labor) re-
sults in a gain of nearly US$1.6 billion. Coupled with a small positive terms of trade 
effect, the overall welfare effect (EV) turns out to be positive but very small at US$ 
103 million. 
 
It is worth noting that the welfare result is obtained by not considering how the funds 
for the subsidies are raised. Through the computation of an additional scenario where 
an income tax hike is explicitly assumed for purposes of paying for these subsidies, 
we observe similar allocation efficiency and employment effects but a much larger, 
negative terms-of-trade effect, and a much larger welfare loss.21 
 
                                                 
19 For a detailed discussion on comparative advantage and China’s agricultural trade patterns, see 
Carter and Li (2002).  
20 In comparison to the increase in total government assistance to agriculture, this number appears to 
be quite small. In a general equilibrium model such as GTAP, subsidies are subtracted from national 
income whereas the derived increases in factor income are added. Welfare losses from the subsidies 
as a distortion are due to their efficiency effects, as the subsidies encourage inefficient domestic 
production. Unlike price-based instrument, these subsidies actually reduce prices which in term gen-
erate offsetting consumer gains.   
21 The negative terms of trade effect due to the income tax can be explained in relation to the closure 
rule applied in the model which specifies the equality between the difference between savings and 
investment and national trade balance. With a substantial income tax hike, rate of return on capital 
falls below the corresponding international rate of return, resulting in less investment from the “glo-
bal bank”. Therefore, the trade balance must adjust upwards, leading to a deteriorated terms of trade.  
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To summarize, by filling both the de minimis allowance and the assumed Blue Box 
cap, China would be able to significantly increase its grain outputs, improve its net 
trade positions in grains (but worsen those in a few non-grain agricultural products), 
and substantially raise farm income. But doing so would result in two conflicting wel-
fare effects: a positive effect from extra agricultural employment and a negative allo-
cation efficiency effect.22  
4.3. Effects of exhausting WTO domestic support “allowances” using decoup-
led instrument (Scenario B2) 
If the additional spending discussed in section 4.2 is used in a decoupled manner – as 
a uniform payment to agricultural land, regardless of where the land is used – simula-
tion results show agricultural outputs in China will remain unchanged and there will 
be no changes to China’s agricultural trade. This implies stable rural employment, a 
result that is different from what is expected from the “coupled” subsidies discussed 
in Scenario B1 in section 4.2. 
 
In this case, the decoupled payments are essentially income transfers to the owners of 
land, as they do not draw additional resources (e.g. rural labor, arable land, and capi-
tal) into the subsidized activities and do not cause inefficient reallocation of these re-
sources across different agricultural activities. As such, they are considered non-
distorting. Indeed, simulation results show higher increase in the returns to arable land 
(66 percent), as compared to the same result reported in scenario B1. Consequently, 
total agriculture factor income rises by 17.2 percent, which is again higher than the 
16.2 percent increase reported in Scenario B1 with the same amount of government 
spending, indicating that decoupled payments are more efficient in raising farm in-
come. 
 
However, because of these subsidies generate no production and trade distortions to 
the economy (other than transferring income from one branch of the population to an-
other), relative prices remain virtually unchanged and no incentives have been created 
to attract more rural labor into agriculture production. As such, virtually no change in 
welfare is observed from the simulation results.23  
                                                 
22 It is needed to point out that the cost of raising the fiscal resources for paying for the 
subsidies is not considered.  
23 The modeling assumption of one representative household also ensures that income transfer 
within that representative household generates no changes to aggregated demands. 
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5. Summary and concluding remarks 
This paper first reviews recent development of China’s agricultural domestic support 
policy, especially the switch from taxing farmers and agriculture to providing direct 
subsidies. From data collected from the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance of 
China, it appears that abolishing agriculture tax means a loss of government revenue 
in excess of CNY 50 billion per year. Most recent report also suggests that direct sub-
sidies to grain producers exceeded CNY 42 billion in 2007. In addition, the Chinese 
government continues its other agriculture assistance programs under the name of 
“building a socialist new countryside”. These changes mandate some quantitative 
analyses on their impacts with regard to the declared policy objectives. 
 
Based on the description of recent policy development, this study offers a model-
based quantitative analysis on the effects of these policy changes. Simulation results 
suggest that recent policy changes likely have positively addressed the two policy ob-
jectives in increasing grain production and farm income. Specifically, results show 
that grain production increases, the trade balance of grain improves, and overall farm 
income as measured by total factor income in agriculture is estimated to rise by 8 per-
cent. Much of the increase in grain production and farm income can be attributed to 
land reallocation to grain production, cheaper inputs, and extra agricultural employ-
ment triggered by the policy changes. Measured in terms of equivalent variation, the 
efficiency effect from reducing agricultural tax and introducing subsidies appears to 
be very small, whereas increased rural employment generates noticeable welfare 
gains (which offset the efficiency losses from introducing the direct subsidies).  
 
Judging from the wide rural-urban and west-east income gaps currently existing in 
China, the declining shares of agriculture outputs in China’s GDP and taxation in 
China government revenue, and most importantly the political consensus at the high-
est level on the importance of improving the livelihood of China’s rural citizens, we 
expect that the abolishment of agriculture tax will be permanent and that government 
assistance (including direct subsidies) to agriculture and farmers will continue and 
rise. Based on this belief, two hypothetical scenarios of China’s domestic agriculture 
support in the future are developed with reference to the WTO limits set on these sub-
sidies. In the first scenario, we assume that China uses up all its WTO de minimis 
support allowances and the assumed Blue Box cap, in a manner that is consistent with 
current practices (including output subsidies and land-based grain subsidies). In the 
second scenario, we explore alternative ways of providing the same amount of sup-
port (i.e. a uniform, land-based subsidy). Simulations of these two scenarios provide 
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further insights into possible consequences on grain production, trade, rural employ-
ment, farm income and economic welfare. Results from the first scenario show large 
increases of grain production over the baseline, a changing trade pattern seemingly 
contrary to China’s comparative advantage, increased rural employment, significantly 
higher farm income (over 16%), and large negative allocation efficiency effect which 
is almost offset by the welfare gains derived from increased employment. In contrast, 
results from the second scenario show that agricultural outputs and trade in China re-
main unchanged, rural employment stays stable. But as a way of transferring income, 
the decoupled payments seem to be more efficient and cause virtually no production 
distortions to the economy (hence no welfare implications).  
 
Several limitations of the study need to be noted. First, the study aims at providing a 
first quantitative analysis on China’s domestic support programs using a global model 
with no details on different types of households and regional/provincial dis-
aggregations. A national model with regional details and multi-household may gener-
ate complementary results. Second, the paper does not formally consider how the 
funds for supporting agriculture are raised. It is conceivable that such funds can come 
from taxations in the urban sector. A more sophisticated model with the division be-
tween rural and urban households would be more desirable. Last, simplified assump-
tions regarding rural-urban migration and rural unemployment are applied in the 
modeling. More realistic and refined treatment of these assumptions may lead to 
quantitatively different results. All these limitations point out to future directions for 
research in this area.    
 
 
Table 1 Agricultural tax reform in China: 2003-2005 (million CNY) 
 2007 2006 2005  
Agriculture tax 1,272 20,403 39,220  
Special agricultural products tax 0 0 2,828  
Agriculture tax surcharge 351 4,894 9,660  
Agriculture tax     
Total 1,622 25,297 51,709  
Source: various documents from the website of Ministry of Agriculture, China. 
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Table 2 Agricultural Subsidies in China: 2004-07 (million CNY) 
Types of subsidies 2007 2006 2005 2004
Grain production 15,100 14,200 13,200 11,600
Purchased inputs in grain production 27,600 12,000 n/a n/a
Seeds in grain production n/a 4,150  n/a n/a
Dairy cows n/a 100 n/a n/a
Agri. Machineries n/a 600 300 n/a
Total 42,700 31,050  
Source: Various documents from the website of Ministry of Finance, China. 
 
 
Table 4 Simulation results: welfare and farm income (US$ million) 
 Baseline 2005 (Sce-
nario A) Scenario B1 Scenario B2 
    
Allocation efficiency -380.2 -165,0.6 -3.6 
Endowment effects 128,6.4 156,1.6 -31.9 
Terms-of-trade effects 155,8.9 226.3 1.3 
Total welfare 225,5.3 102.8 -34.0 
Agriculture factor income (% change) 8.0 16.2 17.2 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3 Policy instruments in base year and in simulated scenarios (million CNY)*  
  2003 Base 
 
Baseline 2005
(Scenario A) Scenario B1 Scenario B2
     
 Agricultural output tax -51,923 0 0 0 
     
Domestic support     
    Total output subsidy, consisting of: 0 0 149,016 0 
      Output subsidy given to all agricultural commodities (de minimis) 0 0 149,016 0 
     
   Total intermediate input subsidy, consisting of:  17,871 70,884 70,792 70,815 
      Fertilizers, Pesticide, seed subsidies allocated to all crops (de minimis) 6,125 56,814 56,722 56,745 
      Advisory service & pest/disease control allocated to all commodities (Green) 11,746 14,070 14,070 14,070 
     
    Total land subsidies, consisting of: 66,860 98,508 206,352 357,813 
      Land-based payments allocated to grain productions** (Blue Box) 0 13,200 121,045 13,200 
      Decoupled land payment (Green Box)  0 0 0 259,306 
      Grain for Green program allocated to all crops (Green Box) 43,582 55,386 55,386 55,386 
      Natural disasters payments allocated to crops (Green Box) 23,278 29,922 29,922 29,922 
     
    Total capital subsidies, consisting of: 26,980 30,428 30,428 30,428 
      On farm investments infrastructure allocated to all commodities (Green Box) 26,980 30,428 30,428 30,428 
     
***Total domestic support payments 111,711 199,819 456,588 459,056 
i
FØ
I
*  Numbers presented in this table are mainly sourced from the OECD PSE estimates for China (OECD, 2006). The designations of the different instruments to the various 
WTO “Boxes” reflect the authors’ understanding and treatment these instruments in the model, with the references to China’s official notification to the WTO (WTO, 2006)    
** Five percent of China’s agricultural production value was roughly CNY 122,045 million in 2004, which is the assumed Blue Box ceiling applied to the land-based payments. 
*** The de minimis limit for China is 8.5 percent of the value of production. In 2004 that limit was CNY 207,476 million. Therefore, the maximum amount of non-green box 
domestic support in scenario B1 is assumed to be CNY 329,521 million (de minimis + Blue Box). Potential complications arising from the possibility of using both product-
specific and non-product specific de minimis payments have been ignored in generating this overall limit. 
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Table 5 Simulation results: percentage changes in domestic production, export and import in China 
 Domestic outputs Exports Imports 
 
Baseline 
2005 (Sce.A) Scenario B1 Scenario B2
Baseline 
2005 (Sce.A) Scenario B1 Scenario B2
Baseline 
2005 (Sce.A) Scenario B1 Scenario B2
paddy rice 0.9 1.6 0 11.3 91.4 -0.1 -15.2 -35 0.1 
wheat 6.3 12 0 48.4 199.5 0 -17.2 -29.5 0 
other cereal grains 2.1 5.8 0 19.9 65.1 0 -8.3 -21.2 0 
vege and fruits 0.3 -0.6 0 -0.9 -12.1 0 0.5 7.8 0 
oild seeds 1.2 -3 0 -4.7 -20.7 0 0.1 2.6 0 
sugar beet and cane 0.2 -0.3 0 -1.7 -27.3 -0.1 0.4 16.7 0 
plant fiber 0.6 -2.1 0 7.5 -9.6 0 -2.7 2.9 0 
other crops -3.6 -10.7 0 -6.1 -17.7 -0.1 1.9 5.6 0 
cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.8 1 0 7.2 9.8 0 -5 -3.1 0 
other animals 2 2.3 0 10.1 13.1 0 -4.9 -4.1 0 
raw milk 0.5 0.8 0 12.9 24.3 -0.1 -5.5 -8.6 0 
wool and silk cocoons 2.2 2.8 0 25.9 36.8 -0.1 -8.5 -11.4 0 
beef and veal 1 1.6 0 2.4 5 0 0.6 0.8 0 
other meats 3.7 5.5 0 26.5 35.1 -0.1 -11.1 -14.4 0.1 
vegetable oild and fats -0.1 -0.8 0 -1.8 -2.5 0 0.9 0.8 0 
Dairy 0.8 1.1 0 0.3 -0.4 0 0.9 1.5 0 
processed rice 0.3 0.5 0 0.5 10.5 0 0 -5.1 0 
Sugar 0.3 -1.8 0 -1.6 -6 0 0.4 1.4 0 
other foods 0.6 0.1 0 0.1 -2 0 0.2 1.1 0 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
Note: results reported for baseline 2005 (scenario A) are percentage changes from the 2003 base; results reported for both Scenarios B1 and B2 are percentage changes 
from the baseline 2005. 
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